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Vilatta, E. (2021). Atribución de creencias e irracionalidad: El caso de los delirios. Discusiones Filosóficas, 22(39), 15–34. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2021.22.39.2
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Emilia Vilatta
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Resumen
En este artículo me ocuparé del debate en torno a la posibilidad de atribuir a los delirios el estatus de creencias, a partir de la tensión conceptual que aparece entre el requisito de racionalidad que exige la atribución de creencias y el carácter irracional que exhiben los delirios. Para ello, analizaré lo que denomino como el “argumento de la irracionalidad” en las dos variantes que identifico: la variante trascendental y la variante empírica. En contra de este argumento, mostraré que, pese a la irracionalidad que manifiestan los estados delirantes, podemos seguir atribuyéndoles el estatus de creencias.
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Reimer, Marga. “A Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions”. Philosophical Psychology. 24 (5), 2011: 659-677. Print.
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Schreber, Daniel Paul. Memorias de un enfermo de nervioso. Buenos Aires: Perfil, 2008. Impreso.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. “Mad belief?” Neuroethics. 5 (1), 2012: 13-17. Print.
Stephens, Lynn & Graham, George. “Reconceiving delusion”. International Review of Psychiatry. 16 (3), 2004: 236-241. Print.
Quintanilla, Pablo. “Comprensión, imaginación y transformación”. Areté. 20 (1), 2008: 111-136. Impreso.
Vilatta, Emilia. “Un enfoque davidsoniano de los delirios: el caso del delirio de Capgras”. Areté. 29 (1), 2017: 183-212. Impreso.
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-5®). Washington: American Psychiatric Pub, 2013. Print.
Bayne, Tim, & Pacherie, Elisabeth. “In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions”. Mind & Language. 20 (2), 2005: 163-188. Print.
Berrios, Germán E. Hacia una nueva epistemología de la psiquiatría. Buenos Aires: Polemos. 2011. Impreso.
Bortolotti, Lisa, and Miyazono, Kengo. “Recent work on the nature and development of delusions”. Philosophy Compass. 10 (9), 2015: 636-645. Print.
“In defence of modest doxasticism about delusions.” Neuroethics. 5 (1), 2012: 39-53. Print.
Delusions and other irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Print.
“Intentionality without rationality”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 105 (1). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
Campbell, John. “Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion”. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology. 8 (2), 2001: 89-100. Print.
Cermolacce, Michel; Sass, Louis & Parnas, Joseph. “What is bizarre in bizarre delusions? A critical review”. Schizophrenia Bulletin. 36 (4), 2010: 667-679. Print.
Cherniak, Christopher. Minimal rationality. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986. Print.
“Minimal rationality and optimal brain wiring”.Proceedings 13th International Congress of Logic, Methodology & Philosophy of Science, 2009. Print.
Currie, Gregory. “Imagination, delusion and hallucinations”. Mind & Language. 15 (1), 2000: 168-183. Print.
Díez, Patricio Antonio. “Creencia y delirio”. Revista de la Asociación Española de Neuropsiquiatría.31 (1), 2011: 71-91. Impreso.
Donald, Davidson. “Paradoxes of irrationality”. Philosophical Essays on Freud. Cambridge: Wollheim, Richard & Hopkins, Cambridge University Press, 1982. Print.
Mente, mundo y acción: claves para una interpretación. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1992. Impreso.
“Incoherence and irrationality”. Dialéctica. 39(4), 1985: 345-354. Print. Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation: Philosophical Essays Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Print.
Problems of rationality. Volume 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Print.
Dub, Richard. “The rationality assumption”. Content and consciousness revisited. Berlin: Muñoz-Suárez, Brigard, Springer Cham, 2015: 93-110. Print.
Egan, Andy. “Imagination, Delusion and Self‐deception”.Delusion and Self‐deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation. New York: Bayne, Hova, 2008: 263-80. Print.
Frankish, Keith. “Delusions, levels of belief, and non-doxastic acceptances”. Neuroethics. 5 (1), 2012: 23-27. Print.
Freeman, Daniel. “Persecutory delusions: a cognitive perspective on understanding and treatment”. The Lancet Psychiatry. 3 (7), 2016: 685-692. Print.
Fulford, Kenneth; Thornton, Tim & Graham, George. Oxford textbook of philosophy and psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print.
Hirstein, William & Ramachandran, Vilayanur. “Capgras syndrome: a novel
probe for understanding the neural representation of the identity and familiarity of persons”. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 1997: 437-444. Print.
Jaspers, Karl. Psicopatología general. Barcelona: Beta, 1963. Print.
Klee, Robert. “Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs”. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology. 11 (1), 2004: 25-34. Print.
Kolodny, Niko. “Why be rational?” Mind. 114 (455), 2005: 509-563. Print.
Landa, Yulia, Silverstein, Steven, Schwartz, Fred & Savit, Adam. “Group cognitive behavioral therapy for delusions: helping patients improve reality testing”. Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy. 36 (1), 2006: 9-17. Print.
López-Silva, Pablo. “The typology problem and the doxastic approach to delusions”. Filosofía Unísinos. 17 (2), 2016: 202-211. Print.
Ludwig, Kirk. Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.
Mandelbaum, Eric. “Troubles with Bayesianism: An introduction to the psychological immune system.” Mind & Language. 34 (2), 2019: 141-157. Print.
Martín, María Isabel; Pérez Chico, David; Liz, Manuel; LópezFlorido, Germán; Fernández, Nuria & Pérez Torres, Lorenzo. “Aspectos internos y externos de la racionalidad: ¿cuáles son los umbrales de la racionalidad exigible y cómo situarlos?” Contextos. 29 (1), 1997: 153-178. Impreso.
Miralles, Inmaculada; González Caballero, Gloria; Piñol, Belén; Morales, Concepción; Navajas, Mar y Sáenz, María Josefa. “Síndrome de Cotard asociado a demencia degenerativa. Presentación de tres casos”. Alzheimer Real Invest Demenc, 56 (1), 2014: 30-36. Impreso.
Read, John, Mosher, Loren & Bentall, Richard. Modelos de locura: aproximaciones psicológicas. Madrid: Herder, 2005. Impreso.
Reimer, Marga. “A Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions”. Philosophical Psychology. 24 (5), 2011: 659-677. Print.
“Davidsonian holism in recent philosophy of psychiatry”. Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford: Preyer, Oxford University Press, 2012. Print.
Schreber, Daniel Paul. Memorias de un enfermo de nervioso. Buenos Aires: Perfil, 2008. Impreso.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. “Mad belief?” Neuroethics. 5 (1), 2012: 13-17. Print.
Stephens, Lynn & Graham, George. “Reconceiving delusion”. International Review of Psychiatry. 16 (3), 2004: 236-241. Print.
Quintanilla, Pablo. “Comprensión, imaginación y transformación”. Areté. 20 (1), 2008: 111-136. Impreso.
Vilatta, Emilia. “Un enfoque davidsoniano de los delirios: el caso del delirio de Capgras”. Areté. 29 (1), 2017: 183-212. Impreso.
