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Miranda Rojas, R. . (2020). La hibridez de lo necesario a posteriori. Discusiones Filosóficas, 21(36), 53–78. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.5
Fomatos de Citação
Autores
Rafael Miranda Rojas
Universidad Católica del Maule
Resumo
El presente escrito propone que lo necesario a posteriori corresponde a un caso híbrido de justificación, sin que ello conduzca a un compromiso racionalista extremo. En los casos de enunciados necesarios a posteriori, los principios lógicos que instancian son de carácter a priori, y la información de enunciados como “Agua es H2 O” o “El dolor es la estimulación de la fibra – c” son cognoscibles solo a posteriori. Para explicar esta hibridez, se discutirá cómo la estrategia vía reductio permite aceptar una aproximación racionalista moderada. Se considerará el bootstrapping como caso paradigmático de justificación epistémica híbrida. La discusión respecto al nexo a priori – a posteriori tiende a establecer una jerarquía, en la que uno de los accesos epistémicos es privilegiado, lo que se rechazará.
Referências
Alvarado, José Tomás. “La noción de justificación a priori”. Discusiones Filosóficas, 9 (12), 2008: 97-122. Impreso.
BonJour, Laurence. In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Print.
Casullo, Albert. A Priori Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Print.
Chalmers, David. “Two-Dimensional Semantics” En Lepore. E. & Smith, B. (eds) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press, 2006: p. 574 - 606. Print.
Crossley, John Newsome & Humberstone, Lloyd. “The Logic of ‘Actually’”. Reports on Mathematical Logic, 8, 1977: 11-29. Print.
Fischer, Eugen & Collins, John (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge. 2015. Print.
Geirsson, Heimir. “Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification”. Philosophical Studies, 122 (3), 2005: 279-304. Print.
Gendler, Tamar & Hawthorne, John (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002. Print.
Howell, Robert. "The Two-Dimensionalist Reductio". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 2008: 348-58. Print.
Jackson, Frank. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford University Press. 1998a. Print.
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip. "A Problem for Expressivism', Analysis, 58, 4, 1998b: p. 239-51. Print.
Kaplan, Rachel. The Experience of Nature: A Psychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press. 1989. Print.
Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1980. Print.
McLeod, Stephen. “Rationalism and Modal Knowledge”. Crítica, 41 (122), 2009: p. 29-42. Print.
Mill, John Stuart. System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. En Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Robson, J.M. (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. Print.
Miranda, Rafael. “Enunciados de identidad, invariabilidad proposicional y estipulación contextual”. Discusiones Filosóficas, 14 (23), 2013: p. 105-133. Impreso.
______. “Enunciados necesarios a posteriori, necesidad débil y racionalismo”. Ideas y Valores, 65 (160), 2016: p. 49-74. Impreso.
______. “Sobre el abuso de lo necesario a posteriori” TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO, 40, I, 2017: p. 211-234. Impreso.
______. “Rigidez de jure y de facto en los términos generales para clases naturales" Areté Vol. XXIV Nº 1, 2012:pp. 57 – 90. Impreso
Nimtz, Christian. (2007). Two-Dimensional Semantics – the Basics. Christian Nimtz. Web
Putnam, Hilary. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975. Print.
Rescher, Nicholas. “Reductio ad Absurdum”. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP), 2002. Web.
Roca-Royes, Sonia. “Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge”. Noûs 45 (1), 2011: p. 22-49. Print.
Schroeter, Laura. "Two-Dimensional Semantics". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophia, Zalta, E. (ed.), 2012. Web
Schwartz, Stephen. “Mill and Kripke on Proper Names and Natural Kind Terms”. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 21 (5), 2013: p. 925-945. Print.
Soames, Scott. “Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility”.
Saul Kripke, Berger, Alan. (ed.), Cambridge University Press. 2011. Print.
Stalnaker, Robert. "Possible Worlds". Nous 10, 2013: p. 65-75. Print.
Tahko, Tuomas. “On the Modal Content of a Posteriori Necessities”. Theoria, 75, 2009: p. 344-357. Print.
Tahko, Tuomas. “A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship”. Ontology Metaphysics, 12, 2011: 151-164. Print.
Yablo, Stephen. “Concepts and consciousness”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (2), 1999: p. 455-463. Print.
BonJour, Laurence. In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Print.
Casullo, Albert. A Priori Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Print.
Chalmers, David. “Two-Dimensional Semantics” En Lepore. E. & Smith, B. (eds) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press, 2006: p. 574 - 606. Print.
Crossley, John Newsome & Humberstone, Lloyd. “The Logic of ‘Actually’”. Reports on Mathematical Logic, 8, 1977: 11-29. Print.
Fischer, Eugen & Collins, John (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge. 2015. Print.
Geirsson, Heimir. “Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification”. Philosophical Studies, 122 (3), 2005: 279-304. Print.
Gendler, Tamar & Hawthorne, John (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002. Print.
Howell, Robert. "The Two-Dimensionalist Reductio". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 2008: 348-58. Print.
Jackson, Frank. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford University Press. 1998a. Print.
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip. "A Problem for Expressivism', Analysis, 58, 4, 1998b: p. 239-51. Print.
Kaplan, Rachel. The Experience of Nature: A Psychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press. 1989. Print.
Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1980. Print.
McLeod, Stephen. “Rationalism and Modal Knowledge”. Crítica, 41 (122), 2009: p. 29-42. Print.
Mill, John Stuart. System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. En Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Robson, J.M. (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. Print.
Miranda, Rafael. “Enunciados de identidad, invariabilidad proposicional y estipulación contextual”. Discusiones Filosóficas, 14 (23), 2013: p. 105-133. Impreso.
______. “Enunciados necesarios a posteriori, necesidad débil y racionalismo”. Ideas y Valores, 65 (160), 2016: p. 49-74. Impreso.
______. “Sobre el abuso de lo necesario a posteriori” TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO, 40, I, 2017: p. 211-234. Impreso.
______. “Rigidez de jure y de facto en los términos generales para clases naturales" Areté Vol. XXIV Nº 1, 2012:pp. 57 – 90. Impreso
Nimtz, Christian. (2007). Two-Dimensional Semantics – the Basics. Christian Nimtz. Web
Putnam, Hilary. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975. Print.
Rescher, Nicholas. “Reductio ad Absurdum”. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP), 2002. Web.
Roca-Royes, Sonia. “Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge”. Noûs 45 (1), 2011: p. 22-49. Print.
Schroeter, Laura. "Two-Dimensional Semantics". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophia, Zalta, E. (ed.), 2012. Web
Schwartz, Stephen. “Mill and Kripke on Proper Names and Natural Kind Terms”. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 21 (5), 2013: p. 925-945. Print.
Soames, Scott. “Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility”.
Saul Kripke, Berger, Alan. (ed.), Cambridge University Press. 2011. Print.
Stalnaker, Robert. "Possible Worlds". Nous 10, 2013: p. 65-75. Print.
Tahko, Tuomas. “On the Modal Content of a Posteriori Necessities”. Theoria, 75, 2009: p. 344-357. Print.
Tahko, Tuomas. “A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship”. Ontology Metaphysics, 12, 2011: 151-164. Print.
Yablo, Stephen. “Concepts and consciousness”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (2), 1999: p. 455-463. Print.
