El realismo y el desafío de la incompatibilidad interteórica

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to tackle the issue of the viability of convergent realism in the philosophy of physics. To do this I present two arguments. Firstly I show, by means of an example taken from theoretical astrophysics and the general theory of relativity that Newtonian celestial mechanics must be wrong. Thus, it is senseless to claim that the Newtonian mechanics could be an approximation to relativity theory. Secondly I point to the existence of theoretical incompatibility between theories and/or theoretical models. If successive theories are incompatible with each other, and in the history of physics we can find plenty of cases of theoretical incompatibility, then it becomes also senseless to claim that science advances approaching to the truth or that mature theories of science (at least) are approximately true.  In the epilogue of this paper, I voice my doubts about the possibility of an alleged metaphysics of science parallel to the philosophy of science.

Keywords:

Agujeros negros

incompatibilidad interteórica

metafísica de la ciencia

modelos teóricos

realismo científico

teoría de la relatividad

Black holes

inter-theoretical incompatibility

metaphysics of science

theoretical models

scientific realism

relativity theory

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