Authors
Abstract
Discussions about how to interpret scientific theories metaphysically are deeply rooted in the history of science and philosophy. The Scientific Realism vs. Anti-Realism debate, however, was instituted as an autonomous field in the second half of last century. In this paper I intend to explore what I believe are the two main sources of modern Scientific Realism: the philosophical interpretations of new theories since the late nineteenth century, and the organization of the epistemological field after Logical Empiricism leave its dominant position. I maintain that a general trend toward the assessment of metaphysical questions in the analysis of scientific theories can be identified, both in the evaluation of Dalton's atomic theory and quantum mechanics, and in the critical reception of called "received view".
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References
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