El expresivismo acerca de las decisiones y la verdad en la toma de decisiones

Abstract

My goal is to illuminate truth-making by way of illuminating the relation of making. My strategy is not to ask what making is; in the hope of a metaphysical theory about is nature. It's rather to look first to the language of making. The metaphor behind making refers to agency. It would be absurd to suggest that claims about making are claims about agency. It is not absurd, however, to propose that the concept of making somehow emerges from some feature to do with agency. That's the contention to be explored in this paper. The way to do this is through expressivism. Truth-making claims, and making-claims generally, are claims in which we express mental states linked to our manipulation of concepts, like truth. In particular, they express disposition to undertake derivations using inference rules, in which introduction rules have a specific role. I then show how this theory explains our intuitions about truth's asymmetric dependence on being.

Keywords:

Agencia

prescripciones causales

expresivismo

manipulación

toma

verdad

la verdad en la toma de decisiones

introducción de reglas del conocimiento

Agency

causal recipes

expressivism

manipulation

making

truth

truth-making

introduction rules grounding

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