¿Es racional ser antirrealista? Una defensa del perspectivismo filosófico

Abstract

In this text, the author defends the rationality (acceptability) of antirealism, because he considers the idea of an independent reality as alien and transcendental. Furthermore, following Davidson, the author argues that all philosophy is a form of antirealism, because it is always a skewed understanding of reality. The author indicates that reality is the set of ‘what we know’ and it is not the pure idea of ‘the external’. However, ‘what we know’, with our possibilities and limitations, is one possibility among others. Following Giere, the author argues that reality, as we know it, is contingent, because reality is always a perspective.

Keywords

Realism

antirealism

truth as correspondence

Ronald Giere

perspectivism

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