DOI: 10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.3
Cómo citar
Piedrahita O. A. (2020). Relativismo epistémico y circularidad. Discusiones Filosóficas, 21(36), 25-37. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.3

Autores/as

Oscar A. Piedrahita
University of California
piedraho@uci.edu
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8776-4067

Resumen

En este artículo, reviso el reciente intento de Steven Bland de refutar el relativismo epistémico por medio de un argumento dialéctico que prueba de manera no circular la confiabilidad objetiva de los sistemas epistémicos naturalistas. Antes de abordar el argumento de Bland, presento la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad y su relación con el relativismo epistémico. Concluyo argumentando que el intento de Bland de refutar el relativismo debe explicar cómo y por qué los compromisos con nuestros sistemas epistémicos deberían llevarnos a juzgar su confiabilidad.

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