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Piedrahita, O. A. (2020). Epistemic relativism and circularity. Discusiones Filosóficas, 21(36), 25–37. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.3
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In this paper, I review Steven Bland’s recent attempt to refute epistemic relativism by means of a dialectical argument that proves non-circularly the objective reliability of naturalistic epistemic systems. Before addressing Bland’s argument, I present the incommensurability thesis and its relation to epistemic relativism. I conclude by arguing that Bland’s attempt to refute relativism must explain how and why the commitments to our epistemic systems should lead us to judge their reliability.
Referências
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Pritchard, Duncan. (2010) “Epistemic relativism, epistemic incommensurability, and Wittgensteinian epistemology”. A companion to relativism. Ed. Steven D.Hales. Oxford, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2010.266–285. Print.
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Print.
Seidel, Marcus. Epistemic relativism: a constructive critique. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave- Macmillan, 2014. Print
Bland, Steven. “Circularity, scepticism and epistemic relativism”. Social epistemology,30.2 (2016): 150–162. Print.
Bland, Steven. Epistemic relativism and scepticism. Unwinding the braid. Cham: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2018. Print.
Bloor, David. “Epistemic grace: antirelativism as theology in disguise”. Common knowledge,13.2–3 (2007): 250–280. Print.
Boghossian, Paul. Fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism. Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2006. Print.
Carter, J. Adam. Metaepistemology and relativism. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016. Print.
Coliva, Annalisa. “Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?” Philosophical Investigations, 33 (2010): 1-23. Print.
Kölbel, Max. “Faultless disagreement”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian society,104 (2003): 53–73. Print.
Kusch, Martin. “Epistemic relativism, scepticism, pluralism”. Synthese,194.12, (2017): 4687–4703. Print.
MacFarlane, John. Assessment sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print.
Pritchard, Duncan. “Defusing epistemic relativism”. Synthese,166.2 (2009): 397–412. Print.
Pritchard, Duncan. (2010) “Epistemic relativism, epistemic incommensurability, and Wittgensteinian epistemology”. A companion to relativism. Ed. Steven D.Hales. Oxford, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2010.266–285. Print.
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Print.
Seidel, Marcus. Epistemic relativism: a constructive critique. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave- Macmillan, 2014. Print
