DOI: 10.17151/jurid.2018.15.2.6
How to Cite
Wong, S. ., Ramos-Toledano, J., & Rojas-Mora, J. (2018). On the in-compatibility of open science with novelty as a standard of patentability. Jurídicas, 15(2), 88–103. https://doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2018.15.2.6

Authors

Sulan Wong
Universidad de La Frontera
sulan.wong@ufrontera.cl
Perfil Google Scholar

Abstract

In this work two objectives are proposed: to explain how novelty, as a requirement for obtaining a patent, hinders the realization of open science regarding communication and use; and to determine the incentives that lead the industry to opt for open science in the proposed terms, leaving patenting aside. To achieve these objectives, the legaleconomic arguments that lead to consider the patent as an incentive for techno-scientific development, and how the “network effect” is restricted by those arguments, will be presented first. Secondly, the grace period is analyzed as an exception that prevents the disclosure of the invention, prior to the application for a patent, from destroying the novelty. Finally, the way the industry welcomes and encourages free software, a paradigmatic case of open science, is studied by identifying that the “network effect” generates a higher usefulness than other strategies of scientific production.

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