Autores/as
Resumen
En este trabajo nos proponemos dos objetivos: primero, exponer cómo la novedad, como requisito para la obtención de una patente, obstaculiza la realización de una ciencia abierta en términos de comunicación y uso; segundo, determinar los incentivos que llevan a la industria a optar por una ciencia abierta en los términos propuestos, dejando de lado el patentamiento. Para lograrlos, primero presentaremos los argumentos jurídicoeconómicos que llevan a considerar la patente como incentivo del desarrollo tecnocientífico, pero cómo el “efecto red” es coartado por la misma. Segundo, analizaremos el período de gracia como excepción que impide que la divulgación de la invención, previa a la solicitud de una patente, no destruya la novedad. Finalmente, estudiaremos cómo la industria acoge y alienta al software libre, caso paradigmático de la ciencia abierta, al identificar que el “efecto red” genera una utilidad superior a la de otras estrategias de producción científica.
Palabras clave:
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