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García Duque, C. E. . (2019). The concept of "rationality" in the practical sphere. Discusiones Filosóficas, 20(35), 31–43. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2019.20.35.3
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In this paper, I shall attempt a characterization of Smith’s concept of ‘rationality’ in the practical sphere. My goal is to show that Smith’s requirements of rationality (as inspired by Williams) cannot provide a good and workable account of what it means to be a fully rational agent. To this end, I shall examine Williams’ internalist requirement on reason and discuss the main shortcomings of such account of rationality. I shall try to show, also, that Smith’s and Williams’ views on rationality are too restrictive and thus cannot be applied to ordinary agents who deliberate in real life.
Referências
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Audi, Robert. The Practical Authority of Normative Beliefs: Toward an Integrated Theory of Practical Rationality. Organon, 2013: F 20 (4), pp. 527-545
Audi, Robert. Reasons, Practical Reason, and Practical Reasoning. Ratio (new series) 2004: XVII, 2, pp. 119-149
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Logins, Arturs. The problem of massive deception for justification norms of action. Acta Analytica, 2014: 220, 1, pp. 1-20
Schroeder, Timothy. Practical rationality is a problem in the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Issues, 20, Philosophy of Mind, 2010: pp. 394-409
Sinhababu, Neil. The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2011: 6,1, pp. 1-13
Smith, Michael. Internal Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 1995: LV, No. 1.
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Watson, Gary. “Free Agency”. (1975) Reprinted in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will. Oxford University Press. 1982
Williams, Bernard. “Internal and external reasons.” In: Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. p. 101-113 10
Audi, Robert. The Practical Authority of Normative Beliefs: Toward an Integrated Theory of Practical Rationality. Organon, 2013: F 20 (4), pp. 527-545
Audi, Robert. Reasons, Practical Reason, and Practical Reasoning. Ratio (new series) 2004: XVII, 2, pp. 119-149
Garcia, C. E. Popper. El conocimiento objetivo y el mundo tres. Manizales: Universidad de Caldas, 2019.
Garcia, C. E. Popper’s theory of science. An apologia. London: Continuum, 2006.
Gao, Jie. Rational action without knowledge (and vice versa). Synthese, 2017: 194:1901–1917
Logins, Arturs. The problem of massive deception for justification norms of action. Acta Analytica, 2014: 220, 1, pp. 1-20
Schroeder, Timothy. Practical rationality is a problem in the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Issues, 20, Philosophy of Mind, 2010: pp. 394-409
Sinhababu, Neil. The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2011: 6,1, pp. 1-13
Smith, Michael. Internal Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 1995: LV, No. 1.
Velleman, J. David. The possibility of Practical Reason. Ethics, 1996: 106, No. 4, pp. 694-726.
Watson, Gary. “Free Agency”. (1975) Reprinted in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will. Oxford University Press. 1982
Williams, Bernard. “Internal and external reasons.” In: Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. p. 101-113 10
