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Publication Date: 2014-07-01
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De Athayde Prata, T. (2014). The dualistic character of John Searle’s philosophy of mind. Discusiones Filosóficas, 15(25), 43–62. Retrieved from https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/770
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Abstract
This paper holds that Searle's biological naturalism is a variant of property dualism. After an exam of the mind-body problem and of property dualism (section 2), and after an exposition of biological naturalism (section 3), I engage in a critical discussion of Searle's view about ontological subjectivity (section 4), a view that leads biological naturalism to a dualism between objective and subjective properties (section 5).
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References
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Corcoran, K. “The Trouble with Searle’s Biological Naturalism”. Erkenntnis. 2001: 307-324. Print.
Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Print.
---. “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. W. Stich and F. Warfield (orgs.). The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Malden, Oxford, Melbourne, Berlin: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Print.
Churchland, P. “Betty Crocker’s Theory” [Resenha de The Rediscovery of The Mind]. London Review of Books. May. 1994: 13-14. Print.
---. Matéria e consciência: uma introdução contemporânea à filosofia da mente. São Paulo: Editora da Unesp, 2004. Impresso.
Crane, T. “Review on The Rediscovery of The Mind”. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Sep. 1993: 313-324. Print.
Cunningham, S. What is a Mind? An Integrative Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Indianápolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000. Print.
Grayling, A. C. “Epistemologia”. N. Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James (eds.). Compêndio de filosofia. São Paulo: Loyola, 2002. Impresso.
Harré, R. “Laws of nature”. W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. Print.
Hodgson, D. “Why Searle has not rediscovered the mind”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1994: 264-274. Print.
Jackson, F. “Epiphenomenal qualia”. Philosophical Quarterly. 1982: 127-136. Print.
Kim, J. Supervenience and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Print.
---. Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005. Print.
Kripke, S. Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Print.
Lange, M. “Laws of nature”. S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge, 2008. Print.
Maslin, K. T. Filosofia da mente. Porto Alegre: Artmed, 2009. Impresso.
Nagel, T. “What is it like to be a bat”. Philosophical Review. 1974: 435-450.Print.
Nida-Rümelin, M. “Causal reduction, ontological reduction and firstperson ontology. Notes on Searle’s views about conciousness”. G. Grewendorf and G. Meggle (orgs.). Speech acts, mind and social reality: Discussions with John R. Searle. Dordrecht, Boston, Londres: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. Print.
Prata, T. A. “Irredutibilidade ontológica versus identidade: John Searle entre o dualismo e o materialismo”. O que nos faz Pensar. 2009: 107-124. Impresso.
---. “Características e dificuldades do Naturalismo Biológico de John Searle”. Philósophos. 2009: 141-173. Impresso.
---. “É incoerente a concepção de Searle sobre a consciência?” Manuscrito. 2011: 557-578. Impresso.
---. “É o naturalismo biológico uma concepção fisicalista?” Principia. 2012: 255-276. Impresso.
Searle, J. R. “Minds, Brains and Programs”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1980: 417-424. Print.
---. Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Intencionalidade. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1995. Impresso.
---. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge Mass., London: MIT Press, 1992. A redescoberta da mente. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1997. Impresso.
---. “Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: a Reply”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Mar. 1995: 217-232. Print.
---. Mind, Language, and Society: Doing Philosophy in the Real World. London: Weinfeld & Nicolson, 1999. Mente, linguagem e sociedade: filosofia no mundo real. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2000. Impresso.
---. Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Consciência e linguagem. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2010. Impresso.
---. “Why I Am Not a Property Dualist”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2002: 57-64. Print.
---. Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.Print.
---. “Dualism Revisited”. Journal of Physiology. 2007: 169-178. Print.
Stoecker, R. and J. Searle. “Interview with John Searle”. G. Grewendorf and G. Meggle (orgs.). Speech acts, mind and social reality: Discussions with John R. Searle. Dordrecht, Boston, Londres: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. Print.
Tsohatzidis, L. (ed.). Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007. Print.
Corcoran, K. “The Trouble with Searle’s Biological Naturalism”. Erkenntnis. 2001: 307-324. Print.
Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Print.
---. “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. W. Stich and F. Warfield (orgs.). The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Malden, Oxford, Melbourne, Berlin: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Print.
Churchland, P. “Betty Crocker’s Theory” [Resenha de The Rediscovery of The Mind]. London Review of Books. May. 1994: 13-14. Print.
---. Matéria e consciência: uma introdução contemporânea à filosofia da mente. São Paulo: Editora da Unesp, 2004. Impresso.
Crane, T. “Review on The Rediscovery of The Mind”. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Sep. 1993: 313-324. Print.
Cunningham, S. What is a Mind? An Integrative Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Indianápolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000. Print.
Grayling, A. C. “Epistemologia”. N. Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James (eds.). Compêndio de filosofia. São Paulo: Loyola, 2002. Impresso.
Harré, R. “Laws of nature”. W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. Print.
Hodgson, D. “Why Searle has not rediscovered the mind”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1994: 264-274. Print.
Jackson, F. “Epiphenomenal qualia”. Philosophical Quarterly. 1982: 127-136. Print.
Kim, J. Supervenience and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Print.
---. Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005. Print.
Kripke, S. Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Print.
Lange, M. “Laws of nature”. S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge, 2008. Print.
Maslin, K. T. Filosofia da mente. Porto Alegre: Artmed, 2009. Impresso.
Nagel, T. “What is it like to be a bat”. Philosophical Review. 1974: 435-450.Print.
Nida-Rümelin, M. “Causal reduction, ontological reduction and firstperson ontology. Notes on Searle’s views about conciousness”. G. Grewendorf and G. Meggle (orgs.). Speech acts, mind and social reality: Discussions with John R. Searle. Dordrecht, Boston, Londres: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. Print.
Prata, T. A. “Irredutibilidade ontológica versus identidade: John Searle entre o dualismo e o materialismo”. O que nos faz Pensar. 2009: 107-124. Impresso.
---. “Características e dificuldades do Naturalismo Biológico de John Searle”. Philósophos. 2009: 141-173. Impresso.
---. “É incoerente a concepção de Searle sobre a consciência?” Manuscrito. 2011: 557-578. Impresso.
---. “É o naturalismo biológico uma concepção fisicalista?” Principia. 2012: 255-276. Impresso.
Searle, J. R. “Minds, Brains and Programs”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1980: 417-424. Print.
---. Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Intencionalidade. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1995. Impresso.
---. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge Mass., London: MIT Press, 1992. A redescoberta da mente. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1997. Impresso.
---. “Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: a Reply”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Mar. 1995: 217-232. Print.
---. Mind, Language, and Society: Doing Philosophy in the Real World. London: Weinfeld & Nicolson, 1999. Mente, linguagem e sociedade: filosofia no mundo real. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2000. Impresso.
---. Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Consciência e linguagem. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2010. Impresso.
---. “Why I Am Not a Property Dualist”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2002: 57-64. Print.
---. Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.Print.
---. “Dualism Revisited”. Journal of Physiology. 2007: 169-178. Print.
Stoecker, R. and J. Searle. “Interview with John Searle”. G. Grewendorf and G. Meggle (orgs.). Speech acts, mind and social reality: Discussions with John R. Searle. Dordrecht, Boston, Londres: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. Print.
Tsohatzidis, L. (ed.). Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007. Print.
