Authors
Abstract
How is well known, the problem of akratic or incontinent actions; i.e., those actions characterized because the agent acts against his best judgement, has been of great interest for philosophers since the time of Socrates. In recent theories, like those advanced by Davidson and by Searle, this problem is examined on the basis of openly contrary claims. In this paper, we shall contrast the views of Searle and Davidson on akrasia. We shall suggest that though Searle's solution is philosophically better than Davidson's solution, still has some limitations and that there is room to entertain other alternatives. Finally, we shall offer one alternative way of explaining the problem of akrasia.
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References
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