How to Cite
Ávila, I. (2006). -. Discusiones Filosóficas, 7(10), 245–260. Retrieved from https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/589

Authors

Ignacio Ávila
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
sincorreo@ucaldas.edu.co

Abstract

This paper is a rejoinder to professor Pablo Arango's criticisms. It is argued, mainly, that even Arango's observations to the contrary, essentialism cannot face an interesting version of conceptual relativity, that the argument that goes from rigid designation to essentialism is not conclusive, and that essentialist metaphysics violates the principle of substitutivity of correferring terms.

ARANGO, P. (2006) “Comentario sobre ‘Realismo, esencialismo y extensionalismo’”, en este volumen.

ÁVILA, I. (2005) “Realismo, esencialismo y extensionalismo”, en Racionalidad y Relativismo, Hoyos L.E. (ed.). Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, pp. 67–94.

ÁVILA, I. (2002) “El nuevo enigma de la inducción y los términos de clase natural”, Crítica, Vol. 34, No. 100, pp. 55-85.

EVANS, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

FØLLESDAL, D. (1998) “Essentialism and Reference”, en The Philosophy of W.V. Quine. L.E. Hahn y P.A. Schilpp (eds.), Open Court, Chicago and La Salle Illinois, pp. 97-113.

HINTIKKA, J. (1975) “Quine on Quantifying in: A Dialogue”, en The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 102-36.

KRIPKE, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity. Blackwell, Oxford.

PUTNAM, H. (1975) “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, en Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 215-271.
Sistema OJS - Metabiblioteca |