El realismo científico de Karl Popper, tan coherente cómo es posible

Abstract

According to some authors, Popper’s realism is blatantly incoherent mainly because of his commitment with the correspondence theory of truth and due to the fact that in his theory of cience is granted that, though the general aim of science is the search for truth, it might happen that a specific theory reaches that aim without us being able of knowing it. In this paper, I explain, briefly, the particularities of Popper’s realism, his views on truth as a regulative ideal for science, and I show that, regardless the impossibility of establishing in a efinitive way that truth has been reached, there is no incoherence that endangers his project. In this way, I answer Cardenas and others’ criticisms against Popper’s realism and his views on the general aim of science, and I identify the sources from which this kind of misunderstanding springs.

Keywords:

Popper

realismo

verdad absoluta

verdad objetiva

fin de la ciencia

Popper

realism

absolute truth

objective truth

aim of science

References

Boyd, R. “On the Current status of Scientific Realism.” The Philosophy of Science. Eds. Boyd, R., Gasper, P. and J. Trout. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. Print.

Cárdenas, L. “Entre la semántica y la metafísica: inconsistencias en el realismo de Popper”. Praxis Filosófica. Ago.-Dic. 2011: 171-190. Impreso.

Carman, C. “‘Realismo científico’ se dice de muchas maneras, al menos de 1111: una elucidación del término ‘realismo científico’”. Scientiae Studia. Ene.-Mar. 2005: 43-64. Impreso.

Drake, S. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1957. Print.

Devitt, M. Realism and Truth. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. Print.

Diéguez, A. “Las explicaciones del éxito de la ciencia. Un análisis comparativo”. Thémata. 2001: 67-83. Impreso.

Galilei, G. The Sidereal Messenger. London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1961. Print.

García, C.E. Popper’s Theory of Science. An Apologia. London: Continuum, 2006. Print.

Giere, R. La explicación de la ciencia. Un acercamiento cognoscitivo. Ciudad de México: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, 1992. Impreso.

Harré, R. Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible. Chicago: Open-Court, 1994. Print.

Lakatos, I. “Falsification and the methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.” Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Eds. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Print.

Leplin, J. A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Print.

Miller, D. Critical Rationalism. A Restatement and Defense. Chicago: OpenCourt, 1994. Print.

---. “Sokal & Bricmont: Back to the Frying Pan.” The Warwick Journal of Philosophy. 2000: 156-173. Print.

---. Out of Error. Further Essays on Critical Rationalism. London: Ashgate, 2006. Print.

---. “Superando la adicción justificacionista”. Discusiones Filosóficas. Jul.- Dic. 2007: 17-32. Impreso.

Popper, K.R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson, 1959. Print.

---. Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Basic Books, 1962. Print.

---. Objective Knowledge. An evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Print.

---. “Replies to my Critics.” The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Ed. Arthur Schilpp. Chicago: Open Court, 1974. Print.

---. Realism and the Aim of Science. Post Scriptum to the Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchison, 1983. Print.

Psillos, S. Scientific Realism: How science tracks truth. London: Routledge, 1999. Print.

Putnam, H. “What is Realism?” Scientific Realism. Ed. J. Leplin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Print.

Steneck, N. and D.C. Lindberg. “The sense of Vision and Origins of Modern Science.” Studies in the History of Medieval Optics. Ed. C. Lindberg. London: Variorum Reprints, 1983. Print.

Tarski, A. “La concepción semántica de la verdad y los fundamentos de la semántica”. La búsqueda del significado. Ed. L. M. Valdés Villanueva. Madrid: Técnos, 2000. Impreso.