Authors
Abstract
When constructing a theory of meaning for a natural language, a dilemma arises. If the theory is extensional, it will not be interpretative. If it is intensional, the theory will beg the question. In this article, we argue that Davidson's extensional theory of meaning escapes this dilemma. First, we present what is that theory. Then, we show the different criticisms that the theory has received, according to which this theory is not interpretative. Finally, we argue that such criticisms are insuffi cient and, moreover, that all intensional theory necessarily commits methodological errors.
References
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