Sentido mínimo de sí mismo y agencia: un análisis del núcleo de la actividad subjetiva

Abstract

The self has been an explanatory principle to understand consciousness in its subjective character. This paper analyses what Gallagher has called the minimal self, its essential core, in its two separable modalities: the sense of ownership and the sense of agency. Some objections are offered to this sharp distinction, which, in turn, considers the sense of ownership as the founding aspect. The phenomenology of normal experiences (involuntary movements or unbidden thoughts) as well as pathological ones (thought insertion or delusion of control) should lead us to the essential component of the agentic nature of the self: intentionality, that is, a relational character or capacity. The minimal and fundamental sense of self seems consequently not o be originally linked neither to neurons or movements nor to psychological states of consciousness.

Keywords:

Sentido mínimo de sí

sentido de propiedad

sentido de agencia

intencionalidad

psicopatologías

Minimal sense of self

sense of ownership

s e n s e o f a g e n c y

i n t e n t i o n a l i t y

psychopathologies

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