DOI: 10.17151/difil.2024.25.45.4
How to Cite
Rivera-Novoa, A. (2024). Thomas Kuhn and the problem of holism. Discusiones Filosóficas, 25(45), 67–94. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2024.25.45.4

Authors

Angel Rivera-Novoa
Universidad de Antioquia
angel.riveran@udea.edu.co
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6793-0307
Perfil Google Scholar

Abstract

This paper critically examines the implications of semantic holism in Thomas Kuhn’s work and its relevance to the problem of incommensurability between scientific theories. While often viewed as an ally, holism actually presents a strong challenge for Kuhn. Two variants of this problem are identified, with explicit answers provided by Kuhn for the first variant but no direct response for the second. The first variant of the problem is the impossibility of communication between speakers with doxastic differences. Kuhn proposes the adoption of the local holism thesis as a solution to the first variant. The second variant concerns the undesirable endorsement of the analytic/synthetic distinction. I contend that the solution to the second variant involves connecting meaning with problem-solving. I propose the acceptance or rejection of counterfactual statements as a criterion for establishing shared referents.

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