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Molinet, J. (2008). -. Jurídicas, 5(1), 57–93. Recuperado de https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/view/5651
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Referências
ALESKEROV, Fuad. (1999). Arrovian Aggregation Models. Theory and Decision Library: Mathematical and Statistical Methods. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
AMADAE, Sonja. (2003). Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
ARROW, Kenneth. (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values. Cowles Foundation Monograph, 12. London: Yale University Press.
______. (1983). Social Choice and Justice. Collected Papers of Kenneth Arrow, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
______ & HURWICZ. (1977). Studies in Resource Allocation Processes. New York: Cambridge University Press.
BADIE, Bertrand. (1992). L´État Importé. Essai sur l´occidentalisation de l´ordre politique. Paris: Fayard.
BRETON, Le & WEYMARK, John. (1996). An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions and Political Domains. Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
CREVELD, Martin Van. (1999). The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DANILOV, Vladimir & SOTSKOV, Alexander. (2002). Social Choice Mechanisms. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
DUMMETT, Michael & FARQUHARSON, Robin. (1961). “Stability in Voting”. En: Econometrica Nº 29. New York: New York University Press.
GAERTNER, Wulf. (2006). A Primer in Social Choice Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
GIBBARD, Allan. (1973). “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result”. En: Econometrica Nº 41. New York: New York University Press.
______. (1977). “Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance”. En: Econometrica Nº 45. New York: New York University Press.
HAYEK, Friedrich August Von. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. New York: American Economic Review.
HURWICZ, Leonid. (1969). On the Concept and Possibility of Informational Decentralization. New York: American Economic Review.
______. (1986). On Implementation of Social Choice Rules in Irrational Societies. Social Choice and Public Decision Making (Essays in Honor of Kenneth Arrow, Vol. I). New York: Cambridge University Press.
______. (1993). Implementation and enforcement in institutional modelling. Political Economy: Institutions, competition, and representation. Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Edited by W.A. Barnett, M.J. Hinich & N. Schofield New York: Cambridge University Press.
______ & REITER, Stanley. (2006). Designing Economic Mechanisms. New York: Cambridge University Press.
KRUEGER, Anne. (1998). ¿Whither the World Bank and the IMF? New York: Journal of Economic Literature.
LYONS, Gene & MASTANDUNO, Michael. (1995). ¿Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
MARSCHAK, Jacob. (1955). Elements for a Theory of Teams. University of Chicago: Management Science Nº 1.
MCGUIRE & OLSON. (1996). The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The invisible hand and the use of force. New York: Journal of Economic Literature.
MCKELVEY, Richard. (1979). “General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models”. En: Econometrica Nº 47. New York: New York University Press.
______ & SCHOFIELD, Norman. (1987). “Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point”. En: Econometrica Nº 55. New York: New York University Press.
MILLER, Norman. (1995). “Committees, Agendas, and Voting”. En: Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics Nº 58. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.
MOULIN, Harve. (1994). Social Choice Theory. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 2. North-Holland: Handbooks in Economics Nº 19. New York: New York University Press.
PALFREY, Tomas. (2001). Implementation Theory. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3. North-Holland: Handbooks in Economics Nº 19. New York: New York University Press.
RENY, Philip. (2001). Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach. New York: Economic Letters.
RIKER, William. (1984). The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787 with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice. New York: American Political Science Review Nº 78.
SCHMITT, Carl. (1979). The Tyranny of Values. London: Plutarch Press.
SCHMEIDLER, David. (1980). “Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions”. En: Econometrica Nº 48. New York: New York University Press.
SCHOFIELD, Nicholas. (1983). Generic Instability of Majority Rule. New York: Review of Economic Studies Nº 50.
SHEPSLE, Kenneth & WEINGAST, Barry. (1982). Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A social choice theory with policy implications. New York: American Economic Review Nº 72.
SPINOZA, Baruch. (2000). Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.
VICKREY, William. (1960). Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules. New York: Quarterly Journal of Economics Nº 74.
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. (1994). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.
AMADAE, Sonja. (2003). Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
ARROW, Kenneth. (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values. Cowles Foundation Monograph, 12. London: Yale University Press.
______. (1983). Social Choice and Justice. Collected Papers of Kenneth Arrow, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
______ & HURWICZ. (1977). Studies in Resource Allocation Processes. New York: Cambridge University Press.
BADIE, Bertrand. (1992). L´État Importé. Essai sur l´occidentalisation de l´ordre politique. Paris: Fayard.
BRETON, Le & WEYMARK, John. (1996). An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions and Political Domains. Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
CREVELD, Martin Van. (1999). The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DANILOV, Vladimir & SOTSKOV, Alexander. (2002). Social Choice Mechanisms. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
DUMMETT, Michael & FARQUHARSON, Robin. (1961). “Stability in Voting”. En: Econometrica Nº 29. New York: New York University Press.
GAERTNER, Wulf. (2006). A Primer in Social Choice Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
GIBBARD, Allan. (1973). “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result”. En: Econometrica Nº 41. New York: New York University Press.
______. (1977). “Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance”. En: Econometrica Nº 45. New York: New York University Press.
HAYEK, Friedrich August Von. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. New York: American Economic Review.
HURWICZ, Leonid. (1969). On the Concept and Possibility of Informational Decentralization. New York: American Economic Review.
______. (1986). On Implementation of Social Choice Rules in Irrational Societies. Social Choice and Public Decision Making (Essays in Honor of Kenneth Arrow, Vol. I). New York: Cambridge University Press.
______. (1993). Implementation and enforcement in institutional modelling. Political Economy: Institutions, competition, and representation. Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Edited by W.A. Barnett, M.J. Hinich & N. Schofield New York: Cambridge University Press.
______ & REITER, Stanley. (2006). Designing Economic Mechanisms. New York: Cambridge University Press.
KRUEGER, Anne. (1998). ¿Whither the World Bank and the IMF? New York: Journal of Economic Literature.
LYONS, Gene & MASTANDUNO, Michael. (1995). ¿Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
MARSCHAK, Jacob. (1955). Elements for a Theory of Teams. University of Chicago: Management Science Nº 1.
MCGUIRE & OLSON. (1996). The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The invisible hand and the use of force. New York: Journal of Economic Literature.
MCKELVEY, Richard. (1979). “General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models”. En: Econometrica Nº 47. New York: New York University Press.
______ & SCHOFIELD, Norman. (1987). “Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point”. En: Econometrica Nº 55. New York: New York University Press.
MILLER, Norman. (1995). “Committees, Agendas, and Voting”. En: Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics Nº 58. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.
MOULIN, Harve. (1994). Social Choice Theory. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 2. North-Holland: Handbooks in Economics Nº 19. New York: New York University Press.
PALFREY, Tomas. (2001). Implementation Theory. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3. North-Holland: Handbooks in Economics Nº 19. New York: New York University Press.
RENY, Philip. (2001). Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach. New York: Economic Letters.
RIKER, William. (1984). The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787 with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice. New York: American Political Science Review Nº 78.
SCHMITT, Carl. (1979). The Tyranny of Values. London: Plutarch Press.
SCHMEIDLER, David. (1980). “Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions”. En: Econometrica Nº 48. New York: New York University Press.
SCHOFIELD, Nicholas. (1983). Generic Instability of Majority Rule. New York: Review of Economic Studies Nº 50.
SHEPSLE, Kenneth & WEINGAST, Barry. (1982). Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A social choice theory with policy implications. New York: American Economic Review Nº 72.
SPINOZA, Baruch. (2000). Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.
VICKREY, William. (1960). Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules. New York: Quarterly Journal of Economics Nº 74.
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. (1994). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.
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