Derecho y ordenamiento de la conducta.

Abstract

This article explores the way in which law orders human behaviour. The argument builds on the basic assumption that law aims to order human conduct, and is inserted in Lon Fuller’s desiderata theory of the Rule of Law. The purpose of the article is to present, justify and analyze the thesis that law mainly orders human behaviour “straightforwardly”, that is, not through manipulation or stimuli. Following Fuller’s methodology, which seeks to identify the requirements law must meet to produce order, it concludes that the straightforwardly ordering of human conduct is both more effective and consistent with the moral dignity of those subject to the law. Thus, it proposes an additional desideratum to Fuller’s theory: that law must order human behaviour in a straightforward way.

Keywords:

teoría del derecho

ordenamiento de la conducta

razón práctica

Lon Fuller

jurisprudence

order of human behaviour

practical reason

Lon Fuller

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