Resumen
Ha sido uno de los alegatos centrales de la teoría así llamada “cognitiva” de las proposiciones que su carácter representacional —y, con ello, sus condiciones de verdad— es derivativo del carácter representacional primitivo de los actos cognitivos concretos por los que un agente predica una propiedad de un objeto. Las proposiciones heredan su carácter representacional porque son ‘tipos’ de actos cognitivos particulares que poseen el ‘mismo’ contenido representacional. Se argumenta en este trabajo que esta suposición está en conflicto con el hecho de que actos cognitivos concretos son instancias de ciertos tipos. Bajo la mayoría de las concepciones acerca de lo que funda el hecho de que una pluralidad de objetos comparte la ‘misma’ naturaleza —i. e., acerca de cómo son algo ‘uno’ en lo múltiple— el carácter cualitativo de un objeto está fundado en universales o en alguna otra construcción aceptable para el nominalista.
Citas
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