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Publication Date: 2014-07-01
How to Cite
Flórez Quintero, D. T. (2014). Reply to ‘about a form of failed but sucessful argument’. Discusiones Filosóficas, 15(25), 213–218. Retrieved from https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/780
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Abstract
In this paper I react to Arango's objections to my (2014), especially to his claim that antirrealists attack the more natural and intuitive realist's views by means of a flawed argument in which they infer a non-tautological conclusion out of a tautological premise. To respond this attack, I explain my view and show that the argument that Arango attributes to me neither represents adequately my claims, nor has a tautological premise.
References
Arango, P. “Sobre una forma de argumento fallida, pero exitosa”. Discusiones Filosóficas. Jul.-dic. 2014: 207-211. Impreso.
Devitt, M. Realism and Truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Print.
---. “Aberrations of the Realism Debate”. Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Print.
Flórez, D. “¿Exige el realismo científico un compromiso con la teoría correspondentista de la verdad?”. Praxis Filosófica. Ene.-jun. 2012: 11-23.
Stove, D. El culto a Platón y otras locuras filosóficas. Madrid: Editorial Cátedra, 1993. Impreso.
Devitt, M. Realism and Truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Print.
---. “Aberrations of the Realism Debate”. Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Print.
Flórez, D. “¿Exige el realismo científico un compromiso con la teoría correspondentista de la verdad?”. Praxis Filosófica. Ene.-jun. 2012: 11-23.
Stove, D. El culto a Platón y otras locuras filosóficas. Madrid: Editorial Cátedra, 1993. Impreso.
