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Publication Date: 2014-07-01
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Miranda Rojas, R. (2014). Bootstrapping and a priori justification. Discusiones Filosóficas, 15(25), 83–94. Retrieved from https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/772
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Abstract
This paper proposes an a priori solution to the so-called bootstrapping problem. To do this, it is first considered Cohen (2010) dilemma and the disastrous consequence (CD) that is derived from this dilemma. To avoid CD, the notion of defeasible reasoning is proposed, whose main characteristics are: (i) a priority and (ii) admission of implicit reasons (RI) not subject to justificatory a posteriori problem. It is argued that RI is the result of a central distinction between weak and strong reading of nexus No doubt/Rely on. Then, RI meets the role of discarding the defeater contingently in occasion O.
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References
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Cohen, S. “Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Sep. 2002: 309-29. Print.
---. “Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning and A Priori Justification”. Philosophical Perspectives. Jan. 2010: 141-159. Print.
Dancy, J. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Blackwell: Oxford, 1985/1986. Print.
Douven, I. and D. Kelp. “Proper Bootstrapping”. Synthese. Jan. 2013: 171-185. Print.
Dretske, F. “Conclusive Reasons”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. May. 1971: 1–22. Print.
Fumerton, R. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Totowa: Rowman &Littlefield, 1995. Print.
Goldman, A. “Reliabilism”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011.
Luper, S. “The Epistemic Closure Principle”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
Pollock, J. “Reliability and Justified Belief”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Mar. 1984: 103-114. Print.
Pryor, J. “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”. Nous. 2000: 517-549. Print.
Ramsey, F. P. “Knowledge”. The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays. R. B. Braithwaite (ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931. Print.
Sosa, E. Reflective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print.
Swain, M. Reasons and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981. Print.
Titelbaum, M. “Tell me you love me: bootstrapping, externalism, and no-lose epistemology”. Philosophical Studies. Apr. 2010: 119-134. Print.
Unger, P. “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge”. Journal of Philosophy. Mar. 1968: 157-170. Print.
Van Cleve, J. “Is Knowledge Easy or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Answer to Skepticism”. S. Luper (ed.). The Skeptics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. Print.
Vogel, J. “Reliabilism leveled”. Journal of Philosophy. Nov. 2000: 602-623. Print.
---. “Epistemic Bootstrapping”. Journal of Philosophy. 2008: 518-539. Print.
Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty. Anscombe, G. E. M. and G. H. von Wright (eds.). New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Print.
