¿Podemos juzgar casos de injusticia epistémica ocurridos en el pasado? Suerte epistémica y responsabilidad epistémica

Abstract

Can cases of epistemic injustice that occurred in the past be judged? The epistemic characteristics of past communities impose a limit for the
attribution of ethical and epistemic responsibility of the agents: to what extent can they respond ethically and epistemically given their epistemic
conditions and limitations? The article is divided into three parts. In the first part, the time gap that exists between the present frameworks and the past frameworks is pointed out, a time gap that can lead erroneously to anachronistic judgments; the second part shows that epistemic injustice is sensitive to the phenomenon of epistemic luck and it is also shown how Fricker deals with this phenomenon and how it is possible, according to the author, to morally sanction past agents; in the third part, two criticisms of Fricker’s proposal are articulated: a strong version of
moral responsibility is not established and the motivation of past agents to overcome prejudice is not explained. To address these criticisms, the
concept of normative contexts of truth, which are sources of normativity that allow articulating a more substantive form of responsibility and also
explain why a past agent would be motivated to make non-prejudiced judgments, is introduced. It is concluded that cases of epistemic injustice
that occurred in the past can be judged without falling into anachronistic judgments and without denying epistemic luck. 

Keywords:

Injusticia epistémica

suerte epistémica

juicio anacrónico

responsabilidad epistémica

Epistemic injustice

epistemic luck

anachronistic judgment

epistemic responsibility

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