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Authors
Rafael Miranda Rojas
Universidad Católica del Maule
Abstract
This paper argues that in the intuitionist proposal developed in Haidt (2001), an intuitionist proposal is not clearly distinguished from an emotivist
proposal. This supposes an epistemic problem, since the first is understood from a cognitivist perspective while the second is understood from
a non-cognitivist position in the moral sphere. Therefore, there is a tension in the presuppositions of the Haidtian intuitionist proposal that, inter
alia, Huemer (2005) discusses from a moderate rationalist perspective. This paper argues that intuitionism does not imply a commitment to the
discussion between moral objectivism and moral subjectivism, thus allowing an approach that permits a fruitful dialogue between emotivism,
intuitionism and rationalism on the epistemic status of moral judgment. This makes it possible to approach the edge of the moral statute
from a moderate rationalist position, open to interdisciplinary contributions and thus to nonreductionist naturalism. This analysis allows affirming that there are moral truths, being the focus of objectivism - subjectivism discussion on the access to them rather than on the questioning of their existence.
Keywords:
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