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Publication Date: 2014-01-01
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Miller, D. (2014). Algunas preguntas difíciles para el racionalismo crítico. Discusiones Filosóficas, 15(24), 15–40. Retrieved from https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/752
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Abstract
'What distinguishes science from all other human endeavours is that the accounts of the world that our best, mature sciences deliver are strongly supported by evidence and this evidence gives us the strongest reason to believe them.' That anyway is what is said at the beginning of the advertisement for a conference on induction at a celebrated British seat of learning in 2007. It shows how much critical rationalists still have to do to make known the message of Logik der Forschung concerning what empirical evidence is able to do and what it does. This paper will focus not on these tasks of popularization faced by critical rationalists, but on some logical problems internal to critical rationalism. Although we are rightly proud of having the only house in the neighbourhood that is logically watertight, we should be aware that not everything inside is in impeccable order. There are criticisms that have not yet been adequately met, and questions that have not yet been adequately answered. Each of the six difficulties to be discussed arises from Popper's exemplary solutions to the problems of demarcation and induction. They concern the management of contradictions; approximation to truth; the corroboration of already falsified hypotheses; decision making under uncertainty; the role of evidence in the law; and the representation of logical content. In none of these areas does critical rationalism yet offer, to my mind, an account comparable in clarity to its solutions to the problems of demarcation and induction. This is a personal selection, and it is not suggested that there are not other hard questions ahead. In only one or two cases shall I offer anything like a solution.
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References
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Cohen, L. J. The Probable and the Provable. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. Print.
Faust, D. H. “On the Structure of Evidential Gluts and Gaps”. Béziau, J-Y., Carnielli, W. A. and D. M. Gabbay (eds.). Handbook of Paraconsistency. London: College Publications, 2007. Print.
Feyerabend, P. K. “How to be a Good Empiricist — A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological”. B. Baumrin (ed.). Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar. New York: Interscience Publications, 1963. Print.
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Hilpinen, R. “Approximate Truth and Truthlikeness”. Przelecki, M., Szaniawski, K. and R. Wójcicki (eds.). Formal Methods in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences. Wrocław: Ossolineum, and Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976. Print.
Keuth, H. Die Philosophie Poppers. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000. Print.
---. The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Cambridge: CUP, 2005. Print.
Keynes, J. M. A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan, 1921. Print.
Kleene, S. C. “Finite Axiomatizability of Theories in the Predicate Calculus Using Additional Predicate Symbols”. Memoirs of the American Mathematical Society. 1967: 27-66. Print.
Koertge, N. “A Methodological Critique of the Semantic Conception of Theories”. Cheyne, C. and J. Worrall (eds.). Rationality and Reality. Conversations with Alan Musgrave. Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 2006. Print.
Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Print.
Kuipers, T. A. F. “Approaching Descriptive and Theoretical Truth”. Erkenntnis. 1982: 343-378. Print.
---. “The Dual Foundation of Qualitative Truth Approximation”. Erkenntnis. 1997: 145-179. Print.
---. From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism. On Some Relations between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000. Print.
Kvasz, L. “How Can a Falsified Theory Remain Corroborated?”. F. Stadler (ed.). Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004. Print.
Lakatos, I. “Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic”. The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1968. Print.
---. “Science and Pseudoscience”. Reprinted in Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge & elsewhere: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Print.
---. “Popper on Demarcation and Induction”. Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle: Open Court, 1974. Reprinted in Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge & elsewhere: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Print.
Laudan, L. “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem”. Cohen, R. S. and L. Laudan (eds.). Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster PA: Reidel, 1983. Print.
Lukowski, P. “A Deductive-Reductive Form of Logic: General Theory and Intuitionistic Case”. Logic and Logical Philosophy. 2002: 59-78. Print.
McGinn, C. “Looking for a Black Swan”. The New York Review of Books. 2002: 46-50. Print.
Michl, J. Without a godlike designer no designerlike God. AHO. 2006.. Online.
Miller, D. W. Critical Rationalism. A Restatement and Defence. Chicago and La Salle IL: Open Court, 1994. Print.
---. Out of Error. Further Essays on Critical Rationalism. Aldershot and Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2006a. Print.
---. “Darwinism is the Application of Situational Logic to the State of Ignorance”. Jarvie, I. C., Milford, K. M., and D. W. Miller (eds.). Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment,Volume III. Aldershot & Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2006b. Print.
---. Haciendo Trabajar a la Ciencia. University of Warwick. 2006c.
---. “The Objectives of Science”. Philosophia Scientiae. 2007: 21-43. Print.
---. “A Refined Geometry of Logic”. Principia. Dec. 2008: 339-356. Online.
---. “Deduktivistische Entscheidungsfindung”. Neck, R. and H. Stelzer (eds.). Kritischer Rationalismus heute. Zur Aktuaklität de Philosophie Karl Poppers. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014a. Print.
---. “Reconditioning the Conditional”. Béziau, J-Y. and D. Krause. London: College Publications. Forthcoming in a volume in honour of Patrick Suppes. Forthcoming, 2014b. Print.
Miller, D. W. and K. R. Popper. “Deductive Dependence”. Actes IV Congrés Català de Lògica. Barcelona: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya & Universitat de Barcelona, 1986. Print.
Mongin, P. “A Note on Verisimilitude and Relativization to Problems”. Erkenntnis. 1990: 391-396. Print.
Mormann, T. “Geometry of Logic and Truth Approximation”. Festa, R., Aliseda, A. and J. Peijnenburg (eds.). Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. Amsterdam & Atlanta GA: Rodopi, 2005. Print.
---. “Truthlikeness for Theories on Countable Languages”. Jarvie, I. C., Milford, K. M., and D. W. Miller (eds.). Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume III. Aldershot & Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2006. Print.
Niiniluoto, I. M. O. Truthlikeness. Dordrecht & elsewhere: Reidel, 1987. Print.
---. “Verisimilitude: The Third Period”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1998: 1–29. Print.
Nordin, I. “The Pragmatic Problem of Induction”. I Jarvie, I. C., Milford, K. M., and D. W. Miller (eds.). Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume II. Aldershot & Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2006. Print.
O’Hear, A. Karl Popper. London, Boston MA, and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Print.
Papineau, D. “Three Scenes and a Moral”. The Philosophers’ Magazine. 2006: 63f. Print.
Parusniková, Z. and R. S. Cohen (eds.). Rethinking Popper. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009. Print.
Popper, K. R. (1930–1932). Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Published in 1979. Print.
---. Logik der Forschung. Vienna: Julius Springer, 1934. Print.
---. “What Is Dialectic?” Mind. 1940: 403-426. Print. Reimprimido en Popper 1963.
---. “On the Theory of Deduction. Part II: The Definitions of Classical and Intuitionist Negation”. Proceedings of the Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. 1948: 322-331. Print.
---. The Open Society and Its Enemies. 2nd edition. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952. Print.
---. “Degree of Confirmation”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1954a: 143–149. Print. Reimprimido en Popper 1959.
---. “Self-Reference and Meaning in Ordinary Language”. Mind. 1954b: 162–169. Print. Reimprimido en Popper 1963.
---. “Verso una teoria liberale dell’opinione pubblica”. Il politico. 1955: 181-189. Print. Traducido en Popper 1963 como “Public Opinion and Liberal Principles”.
---. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson, 1959. Print.
---. Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. London: Routledge, 1963. Print.
---. Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Print.
---. “Intellectual Autobiography”. P. A. Schilpp (ed.). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle IL: Open Court, 1974a. Print. Reprint. Unended Quest. London and Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1976. Print.
---. “Replies to My Critics”. P. A. Schilpp (ed.). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle IL: Open Court, 1974b. Print.
---. Realism and the Aim of Science. London: Hutchinson, 1983. Print.
Popper, K. R. and D. W. Miller. “A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability”. Nature 302. 1983: 687f. Print.
---. “Why Probabilistic Support Is Not Inductive”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series A, 321. 1987: 569–591. Print.
Rochefort-Maranda, G. and D. W. Miller. Bibliography of the Popper/Miller Theorem. University of Warwick. 2014.. Online.
Salmon, W. C. “Rational Prediction”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1981: 115-125. Print.
Salmon, W. C., Dowe, P. and M. H. Salmon. Reality and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
Smith, P. “Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1998: 253–277. Print.
Stein, A. Foundations of Evidence Law. Oxford & elsewhere: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
Swinburne, R. G. An Introduction to Confirmation Theory. London: Methuen, 1973. Print.
Velupillai, K. V. “Demystifying Induction and Falsification: TransPopperian Suggestions”. Boylan, T. A. and P. F. O’Gorman (eds.). Popper and Economic Methodology. Contemporary Challenges. London & New York: Routledge, 2008. Print.
Chamberlin, T. C. “The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses”. Science. 1890: 92-96. Print.
Cohen, L. J. The Probable and the Provable. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. Print.
Faust, D. H. “On the Structure of Evidential Gluts and Gaps”. Béziau, J-Y., Carnielli, W. A. and D. M. Gabbay (eds.). Handbook of Paraconsistency. London: College Publications, 2007. Print.
Feyerabend, P. K. “How to be a Good Empiricist — A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological”. B. Baumrin (ed.). Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar. New York: Interscience Publications, 1963. Print.
---. “How to Defend Society against Science”. I. Hacking (ed.). Scientific Revolutions. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. Print.
Grünbaum, A. “The Degeneration of Popper’s Theory of Demarcation”. D’Agostino, F. and I. C. Jarvie (eds.). Freedom and Rationality. Essays in Honor of John Watkins. Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 1989. Print.
Hilpinen, R. “Approximate Truth and Truthlikeness”. Przelecki, M., Szaniawski, K. and R. Wójcicki (eds.). Formal Methods in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences. Wrocław: Ossolineum, and Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976. Print.
Keuth, H. Die Philosophie Poppers. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000. Print.
---. The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Cambridge: CUP, 2005. Print.
Keynes, J. M. A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan, 1921. Print.
Kleene, S. C. “Finite Axiomatizability of Theories in the Predicate Calculus Using Additional Predicate Symbols”. Memoirs of the American Mathematical Society. 1967: 27-66. Print.
Koertge, N. “A Methodological Critique of the Semantic Conception of Theories”. Cheyne, C. and J. Worrall (eds.). Rationality and Reality. Conversations with Alan Musgrave. Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 2006. Print.
Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Print.
Kuipers, T. A. F. “Approaching Descriptive and Theoretical Truth”. Erkenntnis. 1982: 343-378. Print.
---. “The Dual Foundation of Qualitative Truth Approximation”. Erkenntnis. 1997: 145-179. Print.
---. From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism. On Some Relations between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000. Print.
Kvasz, L. “How Can a Falsified Theory Remain Corroborated?”. F. Stadler (ed.). Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004. Print.
Lakatos, I. “Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic”. The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1968. Print.
---. “Science and Pseudoscience”. Reprinted in Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge & elsewhere: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Print.
---. “Popper on Demarcation and Induction”. Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle: Open Court, 1974. Reprinted in Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge & elsewhere: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Print.
Laudan, L. “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem”. Cohen, R. S. and L. Laudan (eds.). Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster PA: Reidel, 1983. Print.
Lukowski, P. “A Deductive-Reductive Form of Logic: General Theory and Intuitionistic Case”. Logic and Logical Philosophy. 2002: 59-78. Print.
McGinn, C. “Looking for a Black Swan”. The New York Review of Books. 2002: 46-50. Print.
Michl, J. Without a godlike designer no designerlike God. AHO. 2006.
Miller, D. W. Critical Rationalism. A Restatement and Defence. Chicago and La Salle IL: Open Court, 1994. Print.
---. Out of Error. Further Essays on Critical Rationalism. Aldershot and Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2006a. Print.
---. “Darwinism is the Application of Situational Logic to the State of Ignorance”. Jarvie, I. C., Milford, K. M., and D. W. Miller (eds.). Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment,Volume III. Aldershot & Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2006b. Print.
---. Haciendo Trabajar a la Ciencia. University of Warwick. 2006c.
---. “The Objectives of Science”. Philosophia Scientiae. 2007: 21-43. Print.
---. “A Refined Geometry of Logic”. Principia. Dec. 2008: 339-356. Online.
---. “Deduktivistische Entscheidungsfindung”. Neck, R. and H. Stelzer (eds.). Kritischer Rationalismus heute. Zur Aktuaklität de Philosophie Karl Poppers. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014a. Print.
---. “Reconditioning the Conditional”. Béziau, J-Y. and D. Krause. London: College Publications. Forthcoming in a volume in honour of Patrick Suppes. Forthcoming, 2014b. Print.
Miller, D. W. and K. R. Popper. “Deductive Dependence”. Actes IV Congrés Català de Lògica. Barcelona: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya & Universitat de Barcelona, 1986. Print.
Mongin, P. “A Note on Verisimilitude and Relativization to Problems”. Erkenntnis. 1990: 391-396. Print.
Mormann, T. “Geometry of Logic and Truth Approximation”. Festa, R., Aliseda, A. and J. Peijnenburg (eds.). Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. Amsterdam & Atlanta GA: Rodopi, 2005. Print.
---. “Truthlikeness for Theories on Countable Languages”. Jarvie, I. C., Milford, K. M., and D. W. Miller (eds.). Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume III. Aldershot & Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2006. Print.
Niiniluoto, I. M. O. Truthlikeness. Dordrecht & elsewhere: Reidel, 1987. Print.
---. “Verisimilitude: The Third Period”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1998: 1–29. Print.
Nordin, I. “The Pragmatic Problem of Induction”. I Jarvie, I. C., Milford, K. M., and D. W. Miller (eds.). Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume II. Aldershot & Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2006. Print.
O’Hear, A. Karl Popper. London, Boston MA, and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Print.
Papineau, D. “Three Scenes and a Moral”. The Philosophers’ Magazine. 2006: 63f. Print.
Parusniková, Z. and R. S. Cohen (eds.). Rethinking Popper. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009. Print.
Popper, K. R. (1930–1932). Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Published in 1979. Print.
---. Logik der Forschung. Vienna: Julius Springer, 1934. Print.
---. “What Is Dialectic?” Mind. 1940: 403-426. Print. Reimprimido en Popper 1963.
---. “On the Theory of Deduction. Part II: The Definitions of Classical and Intuitionist Negation”. Proceedings of the Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. 1948: 322-331. Print.
---. The Open Society and Its Enemies. 2nd edition. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952. Print.
---. “Degree of Confirmation”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1954a: 143–149. Print. Reimprimido en Popper 1959.
---. “Self-Reference and Meaning in Ordinary Language”. Mind. 1954b: 162–169. Print. Reimprimido en Popper 1963.
---. “Verso una teoria liberale dell’opinione pubblica”. Il politico. 1955: 181-189. Print. Traducido en Popper 1963 como “Public Opinion and Liberal Principles”.
---. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson, 1959. Print.
---. Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. London: Routledge, 1963. Print.
---. Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Print.
---. “Intellectual Autobiography”. P. A. Schilpp (ed.). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle IL: Open Court, 1974a. Print. Reprint. Unended Quest. London and Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1976. Print.
---. “Replies to My Critics”. P. A. Schilpp (ed.). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle IL: Open Court, 1974b. Print.
---. Realism and the Aim of Science. London: Hutchinson, 1983. Print.
Popper, K. R. and D. W. Miller. “A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability”. Nature 302. 1983: 687f. Print.
---. “Why Probabilistic Support Is Not Inductive”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series A, 321. 1987: 569–591. Print.
Rochefort-Maranda, G. and D. W. Miller. Bibliography of the Popper/Miller Theorem. University of Warwick. 2014.
Salmon, W. C. “Rational Prediction”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1981: 115-125. Print.
Salmon, W. C., Dowe, P. and M. H. Salmon. Reality and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
Smith, P. “Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1998: 253–277. Print.
Stein, A. Foundations of Evidence Law. Oxford & elsewhere: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
Swinburne, R. G. An Introduction to Confirmation Theory. London: Methuen, 1973. Print.
Velupillai, K. V. “Demystifying Induction and Falsification: TransPopperian Suggestions”. Boylan, T. A. and P. F. O’Gorman (eds.). Popper and Economic Methodology. Contemporary Challenges. London & New York: Routledge, 2008. Print.
