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Publication Date: 2013-07-01
How to Cite
Jaramillo U., J. M. (2013). Strawson’s and searle’s descriptive theories of reference. Two criticisms to the theories of nonsense. Discusiones Filosóficas, 14(23), 155–177. Retrieved from https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/740
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Abstract
In the first part of this paper I examine the Strawson's objections to Russells' 'theory of descriptions' from the context of a pragmatic semantics emphasizing the importance of the Fregean distinction between logical implication and presupposition. Furthermore, I examine Donella's, Grice's and Devitt's criticisms to the use merely attributive (non-referential) of descriptions by Russell and Strawson. In the second part, I present Searle's theory on the problem of meaning/reference of proper names and the systematic (axiomatic) approach in the context of a theory of speech acts.
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References
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Chastain, Kenneth. “Affective and ability factors in second-language acquisition”. Language Learning. A journal of Research in Language Studies. Jun. 1975: 153-161. Print.
Devitt, Michael. “The case for referential descriptions”. Reimer, Marga and Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.). Descriptions: Semantic and Pragmatic Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.
Donnellan, Keith. “Reference and definite description”. Philosophical Review. 1966: 281-304. Print.
Haack, Susan. Filosofía de las lógicas. Madrid: Cátedra, 2000. Impreso.
Moro Simpson, Thomas. Semántica filosófica: problemas y discusiones. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1973. Impreso.
McKinsey, Michael. “Searle on Proper Names”. The Philosophical Review. Apr. 1971: 220-229. Print.
Rusell, Bertrand. “On Denoting”. Mind. Oct. 1905: 479-493. Print.
---. “Russell’s objetions to Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference”. Analysis. Jun. 1958: 137-143. Print.
---. “Mr. Stawson on Referring”. Mind. Jul. 1957: 385-389. Print.
Searle, John. “Proper Names”. Mind. 1958: 166-173. Print.
---. “Proper Names and Descriptions”. Edwards, Paul (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Print.
---. Speech Acts. An essay in the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Print.
Strawson, Peter. “On Referring”. Mind. Jul. 1950: 385-389. Print.
---. “Meaning and Truth”. Proceedings of the British Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969. Print.
---. Introducción a una teoría de la lógica. Buenos Aires: Nova, 1969. Impreso.
