Debate: ¿El principio de parsimonia o la vergüenza de los ricos?

Abstract

In his reply to my Is incommensurabilty incomparabilty? Aguirre raises the two following objections: i) the article lacks of a systematic analysis of the evolution of the Kuhnian concept of "incommensurability" what prevents an adequate treatment of the epistemological and semantic problems that are derived from the thesis and, ii) he holds that I do not give a rigorous evaluation of the structuralist treatment of the problem of the comparability between incommensurable theories, since my paper not only "lacks the relevant information" but also "avoids the confrontation with views that reject some of the central tenets" of structuralism. In particular, he mentions that I do not take into account Pearce's objections against the notion of aproximative reduction.  In this paper I address these objections and try to show that the criticisms raised by Aguirre do not jeopardize seriously my original view. I think that the gist of my argument, namely that the solution advanced by structuralism to solve the problem of the comparability of incommensurable theories is a promising solution, survives unharmed to Aguirre's attacks. My strategy consists in showing that Aguirre argues out of the false supposition that a tripartite version (Sankey) or a quadruple version (Falguera) of the thesis of incommensurability is systematically and intrinsically more satisfactory that a binary version of the thesis, like the one I prefer.

Keywords:

Inconmesurabilidad

estructuralismo

comparabilidad

reducción aproximativa

Incommensurability

structuralism

comparability

aproximative reduction

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References

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