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Abstract

This article aims at analyzing specific topics of the first chapter "Value and objectivity" of P Grice's book Conception of value. Through this analysis we intend to do a metaethical discussion about the possibility of an objectivity or skepticism concerning moral values. The referred topics are: 1) P. Grice's approach of J. Mackie's Error Theory; 2) the contribution of R. M. Hare to the discussion of J. Mackie's Error Theory; 3) P. Grice's criticisms to R. M. Hare's approach and 4) P. Grice's analysis of the radical anti-objectivism of J. Mackie while opposed to his own objectivist vision. The discussion is concluded by disagreeing with J. Mackie's Error Theory, which asserts moral values as false, when in fact Mackie would have treated it methodologically as "no sense". With it, the skepticism of values proposed by J. Mackie is disqualified when it faces the possibility of an objectivism of values proposed by P. Grice.

Keywords

objectivism

P. Grice

Error Theory

References

Grice, P. “Value and objectivity”. The Conception of value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 23-45. Print.

Hare, R. M. “Some confusions about subjectivism”. Essays in ethical theory. London: London Paperbacks, 1993, p. 15-32. Print.

---. A Linguagem da Moral. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1996. Print.

Mackie, J. L. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin Philosophy, 1977. Print.