Abstract
Can it be better (or worse) for me to exist than not to exist? Several philosophers have denied this, on the ground that if it could, then if I didn't exist, this would have been worse (better) for me, which is absurd. In our paper we argue that these philosophers are mistaken: Claims about the comparative value or disvalue of existence need not imply any absurdities. Such claims, which are of central importance for population ethics and for the status of the so-called Person-Affecting Restriction, can be rationalized if one adheres to the so-called fitting-attitudes analysis of value.
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