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Abstract
The first part of this paper develops a realist view on thought and other mental phenomena, through a criticism of the Platonic points of view (which reify mental states), on one side, and the eliminativistic conception (which considers mentalist language as a fatally confused realm that must be eliminated), on the other. Shortly, the first part claims and explains the thesis that it is possible to be realist about thinking without being realist about thoughts. In the second part, a theory about the content of mental states is introduced, and the theory of non conceptual content is examined. The essentially linguistic model in which concepts are explained is criticized here, to hold that no all conceptual content must be linguistic and, a fortiori, that the thesis of non conceptual content is based in a very restrictive view about the nature of concepts.
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References
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