¿Puede la ciencia decidir el resultado del debate realismo-antirrealismo? El papel de los modelos y las teorías en la metodología de la física.

Abstract

The question that gives title to this article can be shocking. However, it is not an easy question if we realize that this debate is a dispute typical of the philosophy of science. To carry out my task, I will begin with a reference to Paul Thagard, from his book Computational philosophy of science. In fact, this will allow me to focus in the debate between typical scientific realism and structural realism, a new form of scientific realism that comes from John Worrall in the late 80's, and to explore whether it is able to survive the attacks from anti-realist positions. John Worrall proclaimed himself as an alternative to typical scientific realism while a viable form of realism. But if the basic tenets of structural realism are false, as I shall try to show based in the physical theories, we have to conclude that the attempts of structural realism to resurrect realism have failed.

Keywords:

Ciencia

física

modelos y teorías

realismo-antirrealismo

realismo típico

realismo estructural

Science

physics

models and theories

realism-antirealism

typical realism

structural realism

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