El cántaro al agua

Abstract

This paper replies to independent objections by Ignacio Ávila and Leonardo Cárdenas against my defense of an essentialist metaphysics. I argue, again, that essentialism may be compatible with conceptual relativity, and that such metaphysics can face the objection according to which it is forced to be disrespectful of the dictum that two coextensive statements are interchangeable salva veritate. Against Cárdenas' views, I show that essentialism may use, without trouble, examples that appeal to institutional facts, and that the idea that there can be only de dicto modalities is question begging if it is used as an argument against essentialism. 

Keywords:

Ávila

Cárdenas

Kripke

Quine

esencialismo

relatividad conceptual

sustituibilidad

modalidades de dicto

Ávila

Cárdenas

Kripke

Quine

essentialism

conceptual relativity

substitutivity

de dicto modalities

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References

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