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Abstract
This article is a response to Arango's paper (2006) on an essentialist metaphysics with the aggregate of conceptual relativity. In general, I show that the essentialists, among them Kripke, developed this notion based upon an equivocal than I believe dangerous. The point is that if essentialism is a theory that explains the existence of natural kinds independently of our patterns of individuation, their partisans should not appeal to examples that involve institutional facts. Due to this defect, the arguments of the essentialists are not satisfactory. I also intend to show two more faults of an essentialist theory. Firstly, I think that there is a conflation between the material mode of speech and orations of real objects. Finally, I explain why Arango commits an error in the assignment of a function.
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References
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