La matrix como metafísica

Abstract

This paper tries to defend the thesis that the scenario described in The Matrix does not correspond to any skeptical hypothesis. Quite the contrary, the experiences that one has inside the matrix can be as real as those one has in the external world. Furthermore, though the matrix' world is totally simulated, the experiences one has inside it do not have to be entirely false, they may be even true. To argue for these ideas, several hypotheses are examined. Finally, the objections raised against these theses are answered.

Keywords

Matrix

skepticism

computational simulation

world

beliefs

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