El sentimentalismo moral en Hume y el derecho como hecho en Olivecrona

Abstract

In this paper I intend to show the autonomy of the moral that Hume developed in the third book of his Treatise of Human Nature. I ground this conception on Hume's own principle: moral conclusions are not derived from reason. This negative principle brings him to the affirmative principle: moral conclusions are derived from a feeling. Furthermore, I intend to develop the notion of juridical performative in Olivecrona (one of the main Scandinavian juridical realists) by showing how Austin's theory influences Olivecrona's views. Despite showing the sentimentalism in Hume's moral, I believe that his intention was to show the existence of a universalizable moral, which is going to appear in my analysis of the notion of convention and intention in acts of speech. From this, I hold that all daily relations are juridical. To this effect, I focus my analysis on Olivecrona's: Law as a Fact (1939) and The juridical language and reality (1962) in which he supports the view that the juridical language is substantially a part of the daily language. 

Keywords:

Hume

Austin

Olivecrona

Actos de Habla

performativo jurídico

acto de prometer

derecho subjetivo

es”

debe”

expresiones jurídicas

expresiones ejecutivas

autonomía moral

Hume

Austin,

Olivecrona

Speech Acts

juridical performatives

promising

subjective right

“being”

“should”

juridical expressions

realizative expressions

moral autonomy

-

References

-