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Abstract
Quine criticizes two characteristic theses of logical positivism: the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism. On the other hand, he rejects the intensional notions that these theses suppose, such as analyticity, synonymy and proposition. As a change, he proposes a semantic theory about the natural language that intends to account for scientific language without those notions. This paper intends to analyze two aspects of this theory, one that relates Quine with logical positivism and the other one that sharply separates him from it. The first aspect hast to do with the use of a logical-formal strategy as a philosophical tool. The second one takes us to the pragmatic and interpretationist turn –from the theoretical frame of logical positivism–, made evident by the determinant role that this theory gives to the action of the linguistic subject in the constitution of meaning.
