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Publication Date: 2006-01-01
How to Cite
Kelly, S. (2006). -. Discusiones Filosóficas, 7(10), 77–87. Retrieved from https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/579
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Abstract
In this paper I criticize the way in which Peacocke defends the thesis that experience has non-conceptual content. In particular, I argue that Peacocke's reliance on the idea that the experience's non-conceptual content is far more subtle than conceptual content, does not work. Lastly, I hold that the dependence of a perceived object from the perceptual context in which such an object is perceived, and the dependence of a received property from the object in which it is perceived are more relevant features for the thesis that the perceptual content of experience is non-conceptual.
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References
McDOWELL, J. (1994) Mind and World, Harvard University Press. ---------- (1998) “Reply to Commentators”, en Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2.
MERLEAU-PONTY, M. (1962) Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
---------- (1983) Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their Relations, Oxford University Press.
---------- (1989) “Perceptual Content”, en Themes from Kaplan, Almog, J, Perry, J & Wettstein, H. (editors), Oxford University Press.
PEACOCKE, C. (1998) “Nonconceptual Content Defended”, en Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2.
MERLEAU-PONTY, M. (1962) Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
---------- (1983) Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their Relations, Oxford University Press.
---------- (1989) “Perceptual Content”, en Themes from Kaplan, Almog, J, Perry, J & Wettstein, H. (editors), Oxford University Press.
PEACOCKE, C. (1998) “Nonconceptual Content Defended”, en Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2.
