El contenido no-conceptual de la experiencia perceptual: Su fineza y detalle y la dependencia de la situación

Abstract

In this paper I criticize the way in which Peacocke defends the thesis that experience has non-conceptual content. In particular, I argue that Peacocke's reliance on the idea that the experience's non-conceptual content is far more subtle than conceptual content, does not work. Lastly, I hold that the dependence of a perceived object from the perceptual context in which such an object is perceived, and the dependence of a received property from the object in which it is perceived are more relevant features for the thesis that the perceptual content of experience is non-conceptual.

Keywords

Perceptual Experience

Non-Conceptual-Content

McDowell

Peacocke

Evans

Merleau-Ponty

Demonstrative Concepts

References

McDOWELL, J. (1994) Mind and World, Harvard University Press. ---------- (1998) “Reply to Commentators”, en Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2.

MERLEAU-PONTY, M. (1962) Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

---------- (1983) Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their Relations, Oxford University Press.

---------- (1989) “Perceptual Content”, en Themes from Kaplan, Almog, J, Perry, J & Wettstein, H. (editors), Oxford University Press.

PEACOCKE, C. (1998) “Nonconceptual Content Defended”, en Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2.