La intuición racional como virtud intelectual: ¿La solución a todos los problemas?

Abstract

Focused on the answer to three key questions about the epistemic status of intuitions and their possibilities as a source of evidence, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the answers offered by E. Sosa's Epistemic Virtues approach, in order to determine its explanatory scope and its more challenging limitations.

Keywords:

virtudes epistémicas

intuición racional

justificación

Epistemic Virtues

Rational Intuition

Justification

-

References

BEALER, G. (1996) “A priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy”. Philosophical Studies 81: 121-142.

BONJUOR, L. y SOSA, E. (2003) Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism. Foundations vs. Virtues. New York: Blackwell.

SOSA, E. (1980) “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 3-25.

SOSA, E. (1985) “Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue”. The Monist 68: 224-245.

SOSA, E. (1991) Knowledge in Perspective. Selected Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SOSA, E. (1996) “Rational Intuition: Bealer on its nature and epistemic status”. Philosophical Studies. 81: 163-174.

SOSA, E. (1998) “Minimal Intuition”. DePaul, M. and Ramsey, W. Rethinking Intuition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: 257-269.