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Publication Date: 2010-07-01
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Read, S. (2010). El mentiroso y el nuevo esquema T. Discusiones Filosóficas, 11(17), 119–137. Retrieved from https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/564
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Abstract
Since Tarski published his study of the concept of truth in the 1930s, it has been orthodox practice to suppose that every instance of the T-schema is true. However, some instances of the schema are false. These include the paradoxical instances exemplified by the Liar sentence. It is shown that a better schema allows a uniform treatment of truth in which the semantic paradoxes turn out to be simply false.
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References
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WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1961). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Pears, D. & McGuinness, B. (Trs.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
WRIGHT, C. J. G. (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
YAQUB, A. (1993). The Liar Speaks the Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BURIDAN, J. (2001). Summulae de Dialectica. Klima, G. (Tr.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
CARNAP, R. (1963). “Intellectual autobiography in P. Schilpp”. In: The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. (pp. 3-84). La Salle, IL: Open Court.
COFFA, J. A. (1991). The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CHURCH, A. (1940). “A formulation of the simple theory of types”. In: Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 5, p. 56-68.
DAVIDSON, D. (1969). “True to the facts”. In: Journal of Philosophy, vol. 66, p. 304-323. Reprinted in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. p. 37-54.
DODD, J. (2001-2002). “Is truth supervenient on being?” In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 102, p. 69-86.
HINTIKKA, J. (1975). “A counterexample to Tarski-type truth-definitions as applied to natural languages”. In: Philosophia, vol. 5, p. 207-212.
HORWICH, P. (1993). “In the truth domain”. In: Times Literary Supplement 4711, p. 28.
________. (1998). Truth. 2d. Ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
INSOLUBILIA. (2009). “Inncyclopedia Britannica”. In: Roure, M. L. La problematique des propositions insolubles au XIIIe siecle et au debut du XIVe, suivie de l’edition des traites de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine. In: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, vol. 37, p. 205-326.
KRIPKE, S. (1975). “Outline of the theory of truth”. In: Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72, p. 690-716.
MOODY, E. A. (1953). Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic. New York: Greenwood Press.
PRIOR, A. (1962). “Some problems of self-reference in John Buridan”. In: Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 48, p. 281-296.
READ, S. (2002). “The liar raradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine”. In: Vivarium, vol. 40, p. 189-218.
TARSKI, A. (1936). “The establishment of a scientific semantics” (Tr.). In: WOODGER, J. (Ed.). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. 2d Ed. Corcoran, J. (Tr.). Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983. p. 401-408.
________. (1983). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. 2d Ed. Woodger, J. (Ed.). Corcoran, J. (Tr.). Indianapolis: Hackett.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1961). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Pears, D. & McGuinness, B. (Trs.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
WRIGHT, C. J. G. (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
YAQUB, A. (1993). The Liar Speaks the Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
