Modus vivendi, consenso coincidente y estabilidad

Abstract

In this paper, I show how the political theory of a non-liberal giant of the western philosophy canon, Hobbes, can be interpreted as having a commitment to some form of neutrality. In recognizing the role neutrality plays in Hobbes's thought we come to see that a neutrality requirement is not exclusive to liberalism. Beyond this, however, I intend to show that consideration of Hobbes in this context reveals certain helpful points of comparison with Rawls's later work that raise concerns about the viability of his political liberalism. I argue that Rawls's political liberalism, while not a modus vivendi solution to political justification, is ill suited for the securing stability.

Keywords:

acciones humanas

imperativo

Lógica

principios morales

reglas

pragmática

verificacionista

human actions

imperatives

Logic

moral principles

rules

pragmatics

verificationist

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References

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LARMORE, Charles. (1987). Patterns of Moral Complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

RAWLS, J. (1996). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

KLOSKO, G. & WALL, S. (Eds.). (2003). Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory. Lanham, MA/US: Rowman and Littlefield.

TALISSE, Robert. B. (2005). Democracy After Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics. London: Routledge.