Notas sobre el realismo selectivo y sus respuestas a los problemas del realismo científico

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to briefly present three streams of selective realism, namely structural realism, explanationism, and entity realism, and their relation to scientific realism in general. Firstly, we define philosophical realism; then, scientific realism and selective realism are both characterized. The
hypothesis is that the main virtue of selectivism is being able to respond to the problem of unobservable entities in science and to the problem of the historical meta-induction of theories, something that connects it with other realistic proposals. This hypothesis is corroborated in the sections dedicated to these currents, which have the same structure: first, the answer they give to the problem of entities is exposed, followed by the answer to the theoretical problem that the meta-induction argument implies. After all this, there are also some open criticisms of each current.

Keywords:

Realismo científico

selectivismo

inobservables

metainducción

Scientific realism

selectivism

unobservables

meta-induction

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