Duración y temporalidad: una defensa de la concepción del tiempo de Bergson

Abstract

This paper is a defense of Bergson’s conception of time against Heidegger’s accusation on Being and Time. There, Heidegger accused Bergson’s conception of committing the same mistake of the traditional conception of time as a spatialized succession of “nows.” This is an unfair accusation, for Bergson’s main concepts of Duration and Élan Vital are precisely opposite to that. In fact, Bergson’s concept of time coincides with Heidegger’s conception of Temporality which is essential in his existential analytical and fundamental ontology.

Keywords

Bergson

Heidegger

time

duration

Élan vital

temporality

References

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