Detrás de una fenomenología de «lo dado»

Abstract

The main thesis that I shall hold in this paper can be expressed briefly: the given has a referential correlate, not only by fact but also by law. That it has a referential correlate means that a large part of our beliefs about the world have their foundation in the giving of the world’s objects. That this is a question of fact as well as of law means that the given is the source of a large part of our beliefs, not only from a descriptive phenomenology, but also normatively from an epistemological point of view: this must be so if we intend to attribute knowledge about the world and deal with the world in the way that we do.

Keywords:

Fenomenología

mito de «lo dado»

concepto

epistemología

objeto

Phenomenology

myth of given

concept

epistemology

object

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