Detrás de una fenomenología de «lo dado»

Abstract

The main thesis that I shall hold in this paper can be expressed briefly: the given has a referential correlate, not only by fact but also by law. That it has a referential correlate means that a large part of our beliefs about the world have their foundation in the giving of the world’s objects. That this is a question of fact as well as of law means that the given is the source of a large part of our beliefs, not only from a descriptive phenomenology, but also normatively from an epistemological point of view: this must be so if we intend to attribute knowledge about the world and deal with the world in the way that we do.

Keywords

Phenomenology

myth of given

concept

epistemology

object

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