Authors
Abstract
When facing the problem of temporary intrinsics, the dominant positions assume that the subject of change is a concrete particular, i.e., an object that instantiates intrinsic properties in a determinate temporal position. Minority positions either deny the existence of the subject of change or accept the latter as a contradictory subject. In this paper I argue (i) that the current solutions are unable to make sense of the changeable appearances; (ii) that this inability rests precisely on a deficient understanding of the subject of change; and (iii) that an understanding of the subject of change which is grounded on a more tolerant scheme of categories does allow us to make better sense of them. Under this scheme, of idealist roots, the subject of change must be understood as a “concrete universal”.
Keywords:
References
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