DOI: 10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.6
How to Cite
Giromi, J. . (2020). The impotence of representations: a criticism of John Searle’s social ontology. Discusiones Filosóficas, 21(36), 79–104. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.6

Authors

Abstract

John Searle has advocated an intentionalist approach to the social, namely the idea that social reality is created and maintained by certain mental states and speech acts. In this work, we first present a detailed version of Searle’s intentionalist founding arguments based on the connection between collective recognition and language. In the second place, we offer a critique of these arguments, suggesting that they lead us to admit that the foundations
of social reality are more practical than representational.

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