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Abstract
In Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Husserl maintains that the fundamental errors of epistemology originate in an illegitimate metábasis between ontological regions, as occurs in psychologism, anthropologism, and biologism. In contrast to these positions, phenomenology proposes a radical purification of experience through phenomenological reduction, which makes it possible to access the transcendental region of consciousness and its intentional dynamics of constitution. From this perspective, the appearing of beings does not necessarily presuppose the existence of an in-itself object independent of all experience, without thereby denying it. Rather, the hypothesis of an absolutely transcendent reality is bracketed as an excess beyond possible knowledge. The world and objectivity do not present themselves as self-sufficient realities nor as mere subjective projections, but as correlates constituted within the intentionality of consciousness. In this way, Husserl does not simply invert the traditional hierarchy between subject and object; instead, he dissolves their purported metaphysical supremacy, showing that there is no sense of world or objectivity without the subjective dimension, nor transcendental subjectivity without objective correlation. This position constitutes a profound critique of traditional metaphysics and redefines the conditions of possibility for a rigorous science of experience.
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