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Fecha Publicación: 2014-07-01
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Miranda Rojas, R. (2014). Bootstrapping y justificación a priori. Discusiones Filosóficas, 15(25), 83–94. Recuperado a partir de https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/772
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El presente artículo propone una vía de solución a priori al denominado problema del bootstrapping. Para ello, se considera en primer lugar el dilema enunciado en Cohen (2010) y la consecuencia desastrosa (CD) que de este dilema se deriva. Para evitar la CD, se propone la noción de razonamiento derrotable (defeasible reasoning) cuyas características principales son: (i) a prioridad y (ii) admisión de razones implícitas (RI) no sujetas al problema justificativo a posteriori. Se argumenta que RI es consecuencia de una distinción central entre una lectura débil y fuerte del nexo Sin duda/confíe. Por tanto, RI cumple el rol de descartar el derrotable de modo contingente en una ocasión O.
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Douven, I. and D. Kelp. “Proper Bootstrapping”. Synthese. Jan. 2013: 171-185. Print.
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Fumerton, R. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Totowa: Rowman &Littlefield, 1995. Print.
Goldman, A. “Reliabilism”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011.
Luper, S. “The Epistemic Closure Principle”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
Pollock, J. “Reliability and Justified Belief”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Mar. 1984: 103-114. Print.
Pryor, J. “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”. Nous. 2000: 517-549. Print.
Ramsey, F. P. “Knowledge”. The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays. R. B. Braithwaite (ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931. Print.
Sosa, E. Reflective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print.
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Titelbaum, M. “Tell me you love me: bootstrapping, externalism, and no-lose epistemology”. Philosophical Studies. Apr. 2010: 119-134. Print.
Unger, P. “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge”. Journal of Philosophy. Mar. 1968: 157-170. Print.
Van Cleve, J. “Is Knowledge Easy or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Answer to Skepticism”. S. Luper (ed.). The Skeptics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. Print.
Vogel, J. “Reliabilism leveled”. Journal of Philosophy. Nov. 2000: 602-623. Print.
---. “Epistemic Bootstrapping”. Journal of Philosophy. 2008: 518-539. Print.
Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty. Anscombe, G. E. M. and G. H. von Wright (eds.). New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Print.
