DOI: 10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.6
Cómo citar
Giromi J. (2020). La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle. Discusiones Filosóficas, 21(36), 79-104. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.6

Autores/as

Resumen

John Searle ha defendido un enfoque intencionalista de lo social, a saber, la idea de que la realidad social es creada y mantenida por ciertos estados mentales
y actos de habla. En este trabajo, en primer lugar, presentamos una versión detallada de los argumentos fundacionales de Searle, basada en la conexión entre
reconocimiento colectivo y lenguaje. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos una crítica de estos argumentos, sugiriendo que ellos mismos nos llevan a admitir que los
fundamentos de la realidad social son más prácticos que representacionales.

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