The principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Identity of 85 Indiscernibles in the Leibniz-Clarke Polemic

Resumo

In this paper, I survey Leibniz' vieporting relationism, and contrast them wi the arguments of the Newtonian in favor of substantivalism. 1 examine the famous Leibniz-Clarke correspondence and discuss the role of Leibniz'metaphysical principles (the principle of Sufficient Reason, according to which nothing happens in the universe without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise, and the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, or the view that there is no such thing as a pair of numerically distinct objects which are indiscernible from each other). I intend to advance an interpretation of the main issues dealt with in the debate aiming at an answer for the two following questions: (1) whether the Principle ofSufficient Reason entails the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, and (2) whether LeibnizP uses the latter in more than one modal sense in his letters.

Referências

Sin referencias bibliográficas